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Abstract 
This paper presents a brief history of the changing food policy governance in the UK 
and highlights the gradual Europeanisation and Consumerisation of UK food policies.  
The paper discusses the complexities of the private interest model of food regulation 
and the role played by retailers in the food sector in trying to influence consumers. The 
impact of the establishment of the Food Standards Agency on the context and 
implementation of food regulation in the UK also forms the theme of discussion in this 
communiqué. The paper identifies five significant recent developments by way of 
which the State, corporate and private interests, consumers and social interest groups 
build relationships in response to the need for accountability within the UK agri- food 
chain, symbolising the development of a complex public/private set of associations, that 
is evolving as a result of the private, institutional and consumer pressures on food 
regulation.  
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1.0 Introduction: researching the implications of the food safety crisis 
 
John Bowis, Rapporteur, European Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Policy, on the Commission White Paper on Food Safety (2000), 
summarised the extent of the food safety crisis as  
 
“…poor practice and scandals have exercised the media, the public and their elected representatives in 
recent years. The list is long, ongoing and potentially endless given that absolute safety is not an 
attainable goal. Olive oil, contaminated wine, Perrier water, E. coli, Listeria, Salmonella, polluted 
drinking water, BSE, Dioxin sludge and slurry entering the human food chain, pesticides, animal feed, 
GMOs, all in their time and in their way have caused concern, fear, panic and public enquiry.” 
 
Food-borne illnesses and food contamination are not new phenomena. However, the 
pattern of infection over the past twenty years seems to have been altered. Within 24 
hours, food produced in one region can be distributed to any part of the globe and 
outbreaks of infection may occur far from the source of contamination. The spread of 
food-borne diseases in Europe is perhaps a consequence of the Single Market’s success; 
but as with most public policies, unintended and often negative effects can assert 
themselves, and engender an appeal for re-examination of costs and benefits.  
 
Consumer confidence in food safety was seriously undermined with the Belgian dioxin 
scare in 1999. This probably triggered the calls from various public and private bodies 
for the creation of an independent supranational body to regulate food safety in the EU.  
 
Dioxins and PCBs are among the dangerous compounds known as persistent organic 
pollutants. As the name suggests, their effects are particularly lethal because the  
chemicals are very stable and stay in the environment for a long time. Brief exposure to 
high levels of PCBs and dioxins may cause skin lesions and affect the liver. Over 
longer periods, the harm is transferred across generations.  
 
The dioxin case is just an example of the extent of the deepening and multiplication of 
food safety risks in the context of an increasingly integrated European food system. It is 
against this background and with the recognition that compliance with European 
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Commission level decisions are beginning to have a strong impact on food safety 
policies within the UK, that the current research is being undertaken. 
 
While, the first phase of the research, involved mapping the changing dynamics of food 
regulation and accountability across the agro-food chain in the EU (see Smith et al, 
2004, in press for more details); the second phase focuses on the National level (UK). 
The key findings and analysis of the second phase of the research are discussed in this 
paper. The aims and objectives of the research are:  
· To identify ways in which the state, corporate and private interests, consumers 
and social interest groups build relationships in response to the need for more 
accountability within the agri- food chain. 
· Identify how the renewed role of the state, for instance, the establishment of the 
UK Food Standards Agency has impacted on the context and implementation of 
food regulation in the UK. 
 
2.0     Methodology 
 
The research utilises a range of data, analytical techniques and extensive documentary 
research between 2002-04. The broad assessment of the secondary material enabled a 
clear understanding of the driving forces for change in the food safety regulatory 
framework in the UK, their aims and impacts, as well as the path that future 
development is likely to follow.  
 
Data collection for the second phase involved identifying UK-wide, key organisations 
belonging to regulatory/public, private interests and consumer/social interest groups 
closely associated with food and consumer issues, and carrying out a series of face-to-
face and telephone interviews. The interviews enabled us to understand: 
 
· First, the interplay between the potential for regulatory capture, regulatory re-
negotiation by corporate interests within the food industry, as well as different 
methods of agri- food regulation activities that are implemented by the state; 
·  second, the differing regulation and accountability strategies designed to re-
engineer consumer trust in food; and  
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· third, the extent to which the changing nature of agri- food regulation is 
facilitating the emergence & consolidation of alternative food supply chains. 
 
 Interviews were conducted with 8 private interest organisations, 3 regulatory interest 
organisations and 9 consumer and social interest organisations (see Annex for the list of 
the organisations interviewed).  
 
Against the backdrop of food safety scares and the extent of the food safety crises, this  
paper presents a brief history of the changing food policy governance in the UK and 
highlights the gradual Europeanisation and Consumerisation of UK food policies.  
Section three of the paper gives a brief overview of the changing food policy 
governance in the UK. Section four  describes the process of Europeanisation in general 
and highlights the gradual Europeanisation of UK food policy. While the increasing 
consumerist approach and institutionalisation of food policy in the UK is discussed in 
section five; the complexities of the private interest model of food regulation and the 
role played by retailers in the food sector in trying to influence consumers, is discussed 
in section six. The impact of the establishment of the Food Standards Agency on the 
context and implementation of food regulation in the UK forms the theme of discussion 
in section seven. 
 
 The concluding section summarises these five  emergent themes of the research by 
highlighting the more complex model of food regulation in the UK, that is evolving as a 
result of the private, institutional and consumer pressures on food regulation. The 
results highlight the growing significance of incorporating consumer and public 
concerns and constructions in policy making, along with fostering a pivotal and 
globally competitive European food market. The riding of these two ‘horses’-one 
associated with the deepening spatial mobility of food; the other associated with 
continuously giving this mobility some degree of public legitimacy-defines the agenda 
for the new complex model of food regulation. A model which has re-cast private 
interest regulation within a new publicly-defined set of parameters supposedly in the 
(European) public interest. 
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3.0     The changing scope of governance : post-BSE food policy in the UK 
 
The evolution of the UK food policy can be categorised into three phases: The first 
phase represented a period (before the mid 1980s) of a regulatory regime when food 
and agricultural production systems were regarded as being safe unless scientifically 
proven otherwise. The State had a rational and scientific basis on which to test relevant 
public health and food quality assurance policies. This food regulatory approach, 
allowed the State to play a key role in the food supply sector (Marsden et al. 2000), and 
was, for a considerable period, successful in addressing food safety and other public 
health concerns, relating to food. 
 
In Consuming Interests, Marsden et al. (2000) map out the changes and adaptations, 
that have taken place since the mid 1980s, and in how food risk is perceived and new 
regulatory frameworks emerged. They point to advancement from a government-led 
regulatory and monitoring model to a new phase (the second phase) dominated by 
supply chain management, and food standards strategies, designed and applied 
increasingly by the large multiple food retailers. This second phase of food regulation 
was driven primarily by the way food safety issues are perceived by large food 
retailers; leaving the State to act mainly as auditors rather than enforcers of the 
mainstream process. Fig 1 illustrates this second phase private-public food regulatory 
regime in the UK.  
 
Regardless of the fact that the second phase was offering clear improvements in food 
quality assurance, this approach allowed corporate retailers to distinguish themselves 
from their non-corporate competitors, and from each other, on the basis of the 
assurance of quality that they are able to deliver through rigorous supply chain 
management.  
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Fig. 1: The private-public food regulatory regime in the UK (prior to the setting up of the Food 
Standards Agency in April 2000). 
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This dual public / private model of food regulation has, more recently also experienced 
pressure for change as its legitimacy has also been challenged (see Smith et al, 2004 in 
press). 
 
A third phase in the UK was marked by the establishment of the UK Food Standards 
Agency (FSA) in April 2000, with an aim to promote food safety and food standards as 
a non-ministerial department focussing on the protection of consumers and their 
interests. The James Report had revealed a public unease in relation to the corporatist 
style of decision-making in British food and agriculture sector. There was a public 
perception that the process of decision making was steeped in an ethos of secrecy 
(involving Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries (MAFF) and powerful farming, 
industrial and retailer groups). This modus operandi was seen as both benefiting those 
with vested interests and functioned to the detriment of the public. As a consequence, 
the government agreed to remove certain key functions and responsibilities from the 
MAFF and Department of Health (DoH), and vest them in the more independent FSA, 
with the powers to set stringent food safety standards, as well as to enforce them. 
 
The analysis presented here assesses five of the key conceptual parameters and 
dynamics of this third phase in the evolution of food safety regulation in the UK, and 
the powers responsible for shaping this current regulatory framework.  
 
4.0 The evolving food safety regime I: Europeanisation of UK food policy 
 
In its most explicit form, Europeanisation is conceptualised as the process of 
downloading EU Directives, regulations and institutional structures to the domestic 
level (Howell 2004). According to Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) Europeanisation 
consists of processes of (i) construction, (ii) diffusion and (iii) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” 
and shared beliefs and norms. These are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process, and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, political structures 
and public policies. 
 
The nature of Europeanisation involves adjustment to the EU process of aligning two 
institutional logics: that of the EU and that of the UK governance. This adjustment 
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process entails two separate steps. As a first and necessary stage, domestic institutions 
must find suitable ways of processing EU business. The lowest adjustment cost is 
incurred by incorporating EU business into the pre-existing domestic logic of 
governance through some switching mechanism. Bulmer and Burch (2001) refer to the 
two components of institutional response to Europeanisation as reception and 
projection. Reception being the first response to Europeanisation. It is a prior step to 
the projection response, where projection refers to the development of machinery for 
securing an effective voice in the formulation of policy in Brussels. This means, 
learning “the rules of the game” in Brussels and how they may be different from those 
in the domestic political system. 
 
Our understanding of Europeanisation and domestic institutional change can be further 
explained by the simple model, by Risse et al. (2001), where they point out how the 
adaptation pressure derives from the EU level and prompts adjustment of domestic 
institutional design (Fig. 2). Domestic institutions, together with the cultures and norms 
within them, are important mediators of adaptation pressure. 
 
Fig. 2: Europeanisation and institutional adaptation 
 
Source: Risse et al. (2001). 
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The adaptation of UK governance to integration over the period up to 1997 was 
principally one of absorbing EU business into the practices established domestically 
over the last decades. Post 1997, the UK government has built on established trends in 
the UK/EU policy handling, but it has also set up new structures and processes (Bulmer 
and Burch, 2001), which potentially shift the field on which European policy is played 
out at the domestic level. While these changes have not yet led to significant alterations 
in outcomes, they have the potential to do so and they have particularly influenced food 
policy. 
 
The Effects of Europeanisation can be measured along three distinct interrelated 
variables namely: policy content, policy structure and policy style. According to Hall 
(1993), policy content can be divided into three different levels. The first relates to the 
precise setting of policy instruments. The second is the instruments or techniques by 
which policy goals are attained. The third level comprises the overall goals that guide 
policy. The concept of policy structure is potentially very broad, raising some problems  
in defining its boundaries. National institutional structures range from the basic 
building blocks of the State through to policy coordination networks, codes, guidelines 
and ways of working (Peters, 1999, Bulmer and Burch, 2000).  
 
In our research, the key players associated with the food sector in their interviews more 
or less addressed all these variables, with a particular focus on changes in policy 
structure.  
 
It is recognised that the EU is increasingly the main source of food law that needs to be 
formulated in the UK. Directives covering food composition, food labelling, food 
marketing standards, additives, contaminants, nutrition, adulteration and food fraud 
provide a constant stream of new legislation. A clear example is the sentiment, 
expressed  by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and 
the FSA, that the UK government did all that was possible to consult with key UK 
stakeholders on the implementation of UK food law, but that the decisions on standards 
were often made at EU, rather than national, level. This thinking was reflected in our 
interviews with retailers: 
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 “….the vast majority of legislation now is definitely European.”  
 
Similar views about decisions on standards being often made at EU, rather than 
national, level were also expressed by consumer interest groups, they argued:  
 
“…legislation on all aspects of farm animal welfare has been European based. It has come from a 
directive that’s been agreed on a European level and has been taken by the UK and implemented directly 
into UK law with very few changes, very few additions. And now we have the situation where we know 
that any directive will be almost verbatim translated into UK legislation and that nothing else will be 
brought in and changed.”  
 
In earlier work, Marsden et al. (2000) showed, how corporate retailer- led supply 
regulation became empowered, through, the pattern and performance of European food 
hygiene Directives, and the use of quality control and risk management techniques, 
such as Hazard and Critical Control Point (HACCP).  
 
In continuing to pursue the EU’s objective of participative governance (see Artic le 1, 
Treaty on European Union), the European Commission has been engaged in the 
creation of new institutions as a means of securing different interests into the ongoing 
process of Europeanisation (Richardson 2000). In particular, it  
 
“has been a strategic actor in constructing assemblage of stakeholders concerned with each of the 
Commission’s policy sectors” (Mazey and Richardson 2001).  
 
As a result of which, various influential consumer and farming lobby groups in 
Brussels, for example, the European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC), Euro coop, 
Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (COPA), General 
Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union (COGECA), 
Association des Consommateurs Europeens (AEC), and the European Association for 
the Coordination of Consumer Representation (ANEC), receive financial support from 
the Commission. (Smith et al, 2004 in press).  
 
The following excerpt from our interviews illustrate the key trends in this process that 
seeks to deepen the Europeanisation of food policy; For instance, according to COPA:    
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“….the organisation, which was founded more than 40 years ago, is a kind of partner for the 
Commission.  It was a farmers’ body, working in their interests, and … every time there are new 
members in the European Union, there are new members in COPA.” 
  
This was also reflected in our interviews with the private interest groups in the UK, 
who stated:   
 
“…..now Brussels is our principal focus of attention as far as new legislation is concerned. To the extent 
that we now have a team of two people who are based full-time in Brussels, monitoring for us the 
legislation. In terms of legislation we spend a lot more time consulting with various people and trying to 
influence legislation as best as we can.” (Retailer) 
 
While some groups had no qualms about the legislation coming from the EU they 
highlighted the fact that they are happy that there is more focus on consumers; some 
groups exhibited concerns about the law making and emphasised the fact that it should  
be  done in a more effective way.  
 
“… It (Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs (DG SANCO)) has made a difference, 
going back to when DG SANCO was strengthened, there is definitely more of a consumer focus, and they 
were given much more responsibility for legislation.  So we have seen a change in a lot of areas in the 
whole emphasis of the food legislation……And because the food dossier is largely co-decision based, 
that means there’s a lot more scrutiny from the European Parliament for instance, in terms of what 
legislation they’re putting forward”. (Consumers Group) 
 
The general pattern so far has been one of a gradually increasing set of rules on how to 
conduct European business. Thus there has been a proliferation of ‘guidance’, whether 
through the use of precedents or of codified rules. From the preceding extracts we can 
identify some of the key facets, and more specifically dynamics, of the gradual 
Europeanisation of UK food policy. This new transition brings about challenges for the 
various interest groups and their inter-relationships.  
 
First, we now see an increasingly wider diversity of organisations playing a European 
role and seeking to influence as well as to articulate different knowledge concerning 
foods, health and ethical issues. For example, animal welfare groups and the consumer 
groups now have to tackle the intricacies of issues such as the precautionary principle, 
GM and traceability. Part of Europeanisation now involves accommodating a wider 
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and more disparate range of concerns and interests than those just associated with the 
quality of foods.  
 
Second, there is a fundamental issue which Europeanisation and European policy rises 
in the context of devolution in the UK: European policy is reserved to the UK 
government, but much of its substance is devolved. Hence much European business 
needs agreement between the UK and the devolved authorities. Thus according to the 
UK government  
 
“around 80% of the policy areas devolved to the Scottish Parliament has an EU dimension” (Bulmer 
and Burch 2001).  
 
This situation heralds the arrival of a new multi- level governance of European policy 
within the UK. At the same time it means that the new devolved authorities (executive 
and parliamentary) must address the issues of Europeanisation as well as the natural 
context. 
 
5.0 The evolving food regime II: rising consumerist & institutionalisation of 
policies  
5.1 The role of the state in building consumer trust  
The most universal needs and expectations of all consumers about the food they 
consume are safety, price and availability. The most basic role of public policy is to 
ensure that these fundamental consumer needs are met. Once they are met, consumers 
often exercise personal preference in their purchasing decisions. At this point, the 
market should be relied upon to provide consumers with such amenities, and 
government’s role becomes one of ensuring that claims made by industry are not false 
or misleading.  
One suggested lesson from the UK government’s response to the BSE crisis was that its 
preference for a ‘comforting’ approach to communicating with public rather than being 
more open about what was known and unknown, created   
“greater damage to commercial interests and triggered virtually unmanageable levels of public distrust” 
(Randall, 2002).  
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Under these conditions actors fail to recognise that ‘rival rationalities’ and loss of trust 
are fundamental to the success or failure of risk communication, and contribute to a 
more politically controversial risk situation (Gutteling & Kuttschreuter, 2002; Margolis, 
1996). In the face of an untrusting audience, using more science (and risk assessment) 
is believed to feed public concerns, because evidence for a lack of risk often carries 
little weight with the public. Trying to address risk controversies primarily with more 
science is in fact likely to exacerbate conflict (Slovic, 1999). 
In the face of these challenges, increasing attention is being paid to trust in public 
institutions and science and technology and how greater understanding of trust issues 
can improve risk management and communication. A number of studies cite declining 
levels of trust in public institutions and science and technology (Randall, 2002; Petts & 
Leach, 2000; Trettin & Musham, 2000; Slovic, 1999). Trust is thought to be one of the 
most important influences on how people perceive risk and respond to risk 
communication (Petts & Leach, 2000; Finucane, 2000; Siegrist & Cvetovich, 2000). 
‘Trust’ in this context can be defined as a person’s expectation that other individuals 
and institutions (in social relationships) can be relied on in ways that are competent, 
caring and predictable (Beckwith et al. 1999). Public trust may rest more on a faith in 
the capacity of the authorities to cope with the risk rather than remove it completely 
(Star, 1984). 
Trust is also thought to be fragile, it is easily broken, but it is considerably harder to 
rebuild, and in some case cannot be rebuilt (Slovic, 1999). The fragile nature of trust 
can create difficulties in risk management and communication. Langford (2002) cites 
the British public’s response to the BSE crisis as an example of a loss of trust 
accompanied by considerable outrage, changing  
“not only attitudes and opinions, but something deeper to do with our accepted or taken-for-granted 
view of the world”.  
Marsh (2001) cites a need for re-skilling in agencies, which would enable more 
complex analyses of communities; shrewder strategies for engaging diverse 
communities and mediating between competing interests; more advanced skills and 
techniques for incorporating diverse aspirations into policies and programs. In the UK, 
in the third phase of food regulation, many institutions are adopting more interactive 
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and constructive dialogues with the public, and their degree of success is related to 
whether: 
· Clear objectives for engaging in dialogue with the public have been set; 
· It can be established that the exercise is fair, matches methods to particular 
purpose and situations, is well-timed, and uses principles of inclusivity to select 
participants with wide ranging interests; 
· The quality of the processes can be assessed and outcomes can be examined; 
and 
· Sufficient training and resources have been allocated bearing in mind the full 
economic and political costs of not doing so (Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology, 2001). 
 
This has been a major objective of the Food Standards Agency in the UK. It emerged 
that they were striving to build consumer confidence, by first explaining in clear, 
unambiguous  terms what the risks associated with food safety are. 
 
 “I think it (consumer understanding of food risk) is improving, yes it can be quite technical and it can be 
quite difficult but if you have people there together it forces the scientists and the technical people to 
explain things in a way that everybody else can understand…”  
 
Second, clear and effective communication strategies could be achieved through 
increased transparency and stakeholder involvement (Podger, 2003)1, as it is widely 
accepted that trust and confidence in risk management are key to risk acceptance. 
Through “good” communication, trust is increased and therefore the acceptance of risk:  
 
 “Because we operate in this open way, we consult on a day to day basis, both with food industry 
contacts and with consumer organisations. We have consumer representatives on all our scientific 
advisory committees, we have a consumer committee, so we can quote real consumers as opposed to 
consumer lobbyists, actually advising us on the actual decisions we’re taking. And one of the ways we’ve 
been working which we started right from the beginning, is using what we call Stakeholder Groups, in 
                                                 
1 Speaking at the Conference on “Risk Perception: Science, Public debate and Policy Making” 4-5 December 2003. 
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other words we have meetings, often in public, with a range of all our stakeholders all together so 
they’re interacting with each other as well as with us…..”. (FSA)  
 
Third, by making people aware of the risk and supplying appropriate advice on action 
to be taken by them: 
 “We have to think about things like, when we’re doing risk management, is it appropriate to ban 
something, or is it more important to focus on the risk communication and say ‘this is the situation’ and 
we’re giving you the choice, we’ve given you the information and you decide whether to eat this or not. I 
think we’re doing this more than we used to. …… we put more emphasis on risk communication than we 
did before we were in business. We’re saying we think there’s a risk there but we can’t quantify it, but we 
think you should be aware so that you can decide whether or not you want to be a bit choosier about 
what you eat.” (FSA) 
Other studies have shown that an increased public understanding of science alone is 
unlikely to influence acceptance of a particular technology that is perceived as 
potentially risky (Frewer, 1999). In the food sector especially traditional risk 
communication strategies, which focus solely on public education, are bound to fail. 
Experience has shown that presenting the public with educational material does not 
necessarily lead to better public acceptance. On the contrary, people tend to select 
information which is consistent with already held views and values. The Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) seems to adopt the latter strategy, However much remains to 
be seen, about the effectiveness of the strategy. As Frewer (1999) states, the public is 
quite capable of understanding the concept of uncertainty and thus should be provided 
with clear information about the uncertainties around risk. This in turn will increase 
perceptions of trust in information sources and better acceptance of emerging 
technologies. 
Further, consumer reactions to information are often difficult to predict. This is true 
even for shopping behaviour after food scares have been widely publicised. Some will 
translate anxiety into changed behaviour immediately, while others will not change 
either through habit or in consequence of their belief in producer, retailer and 
government reassurances. 
It is increasingly recognised that mutual understanding and consensus-building are the 
best ways to address the elements of values and fairness in risk decision-making. This 
in turn forms the foundation for public trust and confidence in public institutions. 
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Because objective facts are not always the basis for decisions, participation and citizen 
engagement in policy-making is necessary in the formation of acceptable public policy.  
This has been adopted by the FSA in the form of citizen’s juries, for example. 
Such a theory dictates that a successful model for risk communication must reconcile 
the views of scientists, the public and politicians in order to achieve a common 
understanding of complex risks leading to credible management options and credible 
policy development around risk. 
5.2 Role of consumers and other interest groups in policy making 
The old debates about consumer concern as rarely leading to action no longer 
completely holds. Private and public bodies of the food sector now realise that 
increasing consumer advocacy is set to be a powerful force in the market-place as a 
result of a combination of factors. Consumer power should not be under estimated. 
Powerful lobbying groups can facilitate consumer action. For example, in the case of 
GM foods, the call for action has been seen in the increased sales of organic foods. 
Effective and appropriate consumer involvement are essential to ensure consumer 
interests are taken into account to improve the quality of decision making, and to help 
avoid a recurrence of problems that have led to a decline in consumer trust and 
confidence in food and food policy-making institutions. 
It was clear from the interviews that most of the consumer interest groups now claimed 
to play a pivotal role in influencing policy-making. They seemed to be more vociferous 
and responsive to consumer advocacy. The following excerpts from our interviews 
highlight this: 
 
“… it’s ( food safety) an important issue because it’s what consumers are really, are very much 
concerned about, and we are aware that consumers tend to see these issues as a bit of a package, there is 
safety, there’s animal welfare, there is a natural form of production, there are these various values that 
consumers go for…” (Consumer Group) 
 
 
“…. in some ways we know that consumers have more power than government these days. At least that is 
what is said, and in some ways that’s true. So, we go for trying to persuade consumers that they could 
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buy animal-friendly products. And we do that either through the media or education…” (Consumer 
Group) 
 
Some consumer interest groups were of the opinion that they can exercise more power 
in influencing the government in policy-making, only because they have the strong 
backing of the public. This is evident in the following excerpt of the interview with one  
of the consumer interest group:  
 
“…we have the power in as much as we tend to have public support on our side generally, and so if we 
can make that more obvious then we can hope to influence policy and things like that. …the very large 
farmers have the time to be on National Farmers’ Union (NFU) boards and to get represented at the 
higher levels of the NFU where again, they have a great deal of power and influence within government 
although they have made themselves unpopular with foot-and-mouth and so forth...”  
 
The views reflected by the private interest groups were similar in line to the consumer 
interest groups, in that the consumers play a vital role in the policy making process, and 
the private interest groups in turn, value and  communicate the consumers’ perceptions 
into the decision making process. 
 
“I’ve got personal views on consumer groups. A lot of the consumer groups do an awful lot of good, they 
are almost a kind of conscience of society and I think have a very important role to play in terms of 
ensuring that consumers perceptions are fed into the decision making process, but at the end of the day 
there has to be a balance at the various levels. I think they are knowledgeable, they are articulate”. 
(Retailer) 
 
Considering the importance of the consumers in the policy-making process, regulatory 
activity of the food control organisation should establish well-designed and well-
publicized procedures for receiving and considering consumer and industry inputs at 
the policy-making level. A regulatory body interviewed in our research stated: 
 “We have a division which is marketing and consumers and that provides us focus for consumer 
considerations.” (DEFRA) 
 
There is no doubt that the consumers are increasingly influencing food regulation by 
selection or rejection of food considered healthy or hazardous. Therefore large scale 
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retailing organisations and various consumer interest groups acting as intermediaries 
between the spheres of production and consumption are very sensitive to consumers’ 
preferences and practices.  
 
5.3 The implosion of the (now far more sensitive) consumer and producer divide 
Over the course of the late twentieth century, market dominance by distributors and 
wholesalers gave way to dominance by manufacturers, followed by the current period 
of dominance by integrated distributor-retailers. One of the most controversial elements 
of supermarket’s dominance of the food retail sector is their impact on farming. For 
many years in the UK there have been accusations that the big multiples are reaping 
excessive profits from the agri- food chain by “turning the screw” on suppliers and 
primary producers. The squeeze on farming (and farm-gate prices, specifically) is by 
extension, said to be affecting the resilience of the rural economy and quality of the 
environment. 
Although the retail industry has been found to be broadly competitive (Supermarkets, 
2000), the sheer scale and buying power of the global retailers makes them subject to 
increasing scrutiny, and a level of discontent in farming which has occasionally been 
expressed in militant action against stores and depots. Around 230,000 UK farmers 
trade with the majority of consumers via only a handful of supermarket companies, 
where UK consumers purchase 75-80% of their groceries (Euro Monitor, 2003). The 
profit of all those 230,000 farms has been roughly equivalent with the profit of just six 
major supermarket chains (Euro Monitor, 2003) 
In comparison, to the producers’ eroding power, retailers and traders have a powerful 
economic position, which enables them to wield a powerful position in the industry, to 
influence policy decisions. This was also highlighted in our interviews with the 
consumer interests groups. 
“… If you’re talking about small farmers, medium sized farmers, family farmers, I think that they 
probably don’t have very much influence at all.” (Consumer Group) 
 
A possible way to narrow the divide between the retailers and producers was also 
suggested by one of the consumer interest groups, who stated: 
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“…. what we have to do is to make processors and farmers work with the retailer rules. The retailers are 
short hand for customers; they translate what the customer wants. Whatever people might think of 
retailers, they are very good at translating the customer needs. So, in that case we have no choice but to 
follow them, because they represent the customer.” (Farmers Union) 
 
From the preceding extracts it is evident that there is a widespread recognition among 
the various groups interviewed that effective and appropriate consumer involvement is 
essential; so as to ensure consumers interests are taken into account to improve the 
quality of decision-making, and to help avoid a recurrence of the problems that have led 
to a decline in consumer trust, and confidence in food and food policy-making 
institutions. However, this consumer involvement is seen as increasingly (and 
effectively) mediated through the corporate retailers. In the third phase of food 
regulation it was also recognized that there has to be a shift in attitudes, policies and 
practices so that consumer involvement is more at the heart of decision-making. There 
has been increasing government emphasis in recent years on greater public involvement 
in decision-making and service provision both in the UK and the EU. However, it is 
unclear whether the so-called consumer involvement these organisations promote is 
carried out to fulfil a formal requirement to do so- as a “box-ticking” exercise, or 
whether it is done to legitimise or avoid taking what might be an unpopular decision. It 
also emerges from the interviews that consumer voices from Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and other consumer organisations are often regarded as ‘self-
appointed’ and are not necessarily representative of the mass of consumers. 
Interviewees acknowledged that the setting up of the Food Standards Agency in the UK 
in 2000 represented a significant move towards greater consumer involvement in the 
food sector. The more recently created DEFRA has also committed itself to new ways 
of working but is  seen as still at an early stage in developing more consumers - focussed 
strategies. 
 
6.0 The evolving food regime III: the ensuing complex private interest model of 
food regulation 
6.1 Role of retailers 
The distinctive feature of the recent restructuring of the UK food chain is that it is 
retailer-driven. Retailers have a powerful position in the food system (Dobson & 
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Waterson, 1996; Fiddis, 1997), and through their traceability and quality assurance 
schemes (QAS) are able to influence the entire food production chain, and also 
importantly to define its margins. Due to retailer initiatives in new product 
development, and vertical and horizontal alliances, they play a particularly influential 
role in the market place, in terms of both food use and acceptability (Ellahi, 1996). 
Indeed, the  quality/value system that each retailer applies, and the policies adopted, can 
have significant impacts on many of the other interested parties, such as producers and 
consumers.  
The retailers’ influential position is further heightened by the current retailer market 
and related management strategies. Food retailers and supermarkets have grown by 
0.1% since 2001 to reach a value of £80.4 billion in 2002. Large grocery outlets 
dominate the food retail market with over 81% share of value sales in 2002, with the 
retail market leader, accounting for 25% of UK food retailing in 2002 (Euro monitor, 
2003). 
Innovations in own-brand products in the UK market further strengthen this position. 
These not only give retailers better margins, but also increase their negotiating position 
with manufacturer brands. Manufacturers find themselves in the position of both 
trading partner and competitor. The following excerpt from our interview with a 
consumer interest group draws attention to the powerful position of retailers.  
“….the retailers influence the policy making and the decision making quite significantly because they are 
extremely powerful and can influence the decision making in the products around the supermarket 
shelves. I think their role is may be one of too much strength.” (Consumer group) 
 
However, to remain profitable in a competitive environment, they must meet consumer 
needs. In order to facilitate competitiveness and ensure that share of the market is 
maintained, they endeavour to identify and anticipate consumer expectations in advance 
of sales (Hill & Merton, 1995) this is becoming more difficult. The behaviour of 
consumers is becoming increasingly volatile and concerned with the instant satisfaction 
of their wants (NRLO, 1998), and therefore, some retail policies can be of a speculative 
nature. 
Customers today are no longer prepared to be dictated to by suppliers, and have become 
more assertive, more demanding, more individualistic and more affluent in their tastes. 
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The market power of consumers is seen as growing stronger as a result of fierce retailer 
competition; new technology and new business practices. The retailers are the self-  
selected barometers of this process. 
Consumer market power is becoming ingrained through the increased use of retail 
scanning data to decide product assortment, prices and marketing strategies. Successful 
retailers have perfected the art of customising their service offering both hierarchically 
in socio-economic terms, and spatially in the judicious location of stores. This ensures 
they produce what customers want, when they want it, and at a price they are willing to 
pay, as one of the consumer interest group interviewed by us said:  
 
“Sometimes there’s been a tendency in the past to try and present themselves (retailers) as though they 
should really be the consumer organisations because they know their consumers; but they have the 
information for different reasons, for commercial reasons in order to take advantage of that.  Sometimes 
we’ve found it very useful to work with the retailers, like on GM, they had a crucial role to play and 
completely were able to shift the supply chain and ensure non-GM supplies and at a time when the 
government wasn’t accepting any responsibility at all for GM and lack of consumer choice.  So it was 
down to them that consumers could have a choice.” (Consumer group) 
 
Another consumer interest group argues,  
 
“The retailers have a huge amount of influence on certain issues, in the sense that they can determine 
what is sold in the shops and they’re very receptive to consumer pressure. So for example on GM crops 
they have effectively stopped the market through, because consumer pressure asked them to practically. 
In terms of government policy, we have found that some of the big corporations input, or the bio-tech 
companies, pesticide companies, and their associations like the Crop Protection Association, seem to be 
able to wield an enormous amount of lobbying power, and in many cases they seem to have very good 
links into the particular branches of government that deal with these issues”. (Consumer group) 
 
An explanation to this movement of power substitution of the state regulation seems to 
come from the change in food habits. The increase in consumers’ income and the 
transition to more “sophisticated” consumption has reduced the demand for 
undifferentiated products. The labelling and defining characteristics of quality are 
therefore directly linked to the competitive food retail market.  
Additiona l influences on retailers’ roles and responsibilities are the potential failings in 
the market system. In the present “free-market economy”, although the government 
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intervenes to protect consumers from health and safety market failures, consumer 
autonomy and choice is highly valued; so that non- interference is favoured above 
paternalistic intervention as a guiding principle of government policy (i.e. the “nanny 
state” versus the freedom of choice). While consumers may ultimately influence or veto 
whether a new technology is successfully adopted through their purchasing power, 
consumer autonomy can be compromised by several factors. For example, if there are 
limitations on the availability and accuracy of information on a food product, market 
mechanisms may not always ensure that the desired controls are in place to maintain 
consumer confidence. In these situations, trust is transferred from legislators and the 
market to the retailer. These are increasingly perceived to act as a mediator of consumer 
interest. Hill and Merton (1995) note that  
“probably most consumers consider ensuring the acceptability of  practices (production methods) is 
the responsibility of the retailer”.  
It is argued that retailers have been able to respond to consumer needs, thanks to the 
“Information Age”, which has created significant new forms of marketing, 
communication and business. Customer information at all points of communication 
means that production can be tailored to an increasingly accurate degree, thereby saving 
money and increasing profit margin. 
“You keep an eye on what’s going on generally in the market and look at other market research you can 
really try and predict where things are going to go, going to develop. Other than that, try and predict 
what they think latest trends would be to probably give us some idea, of what we can or cannot do.” 
(Retailer) 
 
Moreover, in the light of the dynamics of the retailer-consumer relationship, retailers 
see their responsibilities as lying in several distinct areas of safe food and facilitating 
consumer choice. This is discernible from the excerpts of the interviews carried out 
with some private interest groups. 
 
“…what we need to make sure is we’ve got all the right procedures in place to supply those products to 
our customers so that they’re safe, good quality and legal.”  (Retailer) 
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“….yes we want to chuck in things for the customers benefit and we do need to understand our customers 
and what they need.” (Retailer) 
 
The consumer interest groups were of the opinion that, on one hand, there were some 
retailers who were very forthcoming and innovative in satisfying customer demands. 
 
“Some of the big supermarkets have been far more reticent about making concrete moves in the right 
direction on animal feed certainly people like TESCOs. Whereas, on the other hand, you have more 
progressive supermarkets like the Co-op and definitely M&S who are just far more helpful. So you often 
hear from someone like TESCO who will say well actually we can’t source non-GM animal feed even 
though our customers might want it. It’s impossible. And then you’ll hear from M&S the next day who 
say well actually we’ve already done it so it’s an interesting situation”. (Consumer Group) 
 
“There is a great deal of evidence to show that food manufacturers have improved the food supply in the 
UK over the last 20 years. In terms of food manufacturers they make some attempt, for example, to 
reduce sugar and salt in processed food but it is very marginal of what they have done, and it is also 
variable, so you have got some retailers who have been very good and very proactive in trying to provide 
some health initiative”. (Consumer Group) 
 
And, on the other hand, there were also some who for the fear of being “named and 
shamed” would adopt measures to satisfy and meet consumer needs.  
        
“I think it’s a similar sort of line to the supermarkets because a lot of them, especially the bigger ones, 
had this idea that they weren’t going to be doing anything more on GM so they were quite happy to just 
give us the cold shoulder, and last week we re-launched our shoppers’ guide on the website and people 
have been phoning in and saying oh please, take us off the orange or the red list.” (Greenpeace) 
 
“Yes, [in] some things they are very influential but I think it has its limitations working with them as well 
because of the way that they operate”. (Consumer Association) 
 
Consumer demand and its dynamic construction by retailers drive the entire food 
network. This demand is shaped by many factors. The most influential is the impact of 
the large multiple retailers on consumer selection and choice; through their contractual 
relationships with primary producers and food manufacturers, and their extensive 
promotional activity. A large majority of choices and decisions regarding food 
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consumption are made just prior to the act of consumer purchasing. The success of 
retailers in their own eyes has in the main been due to their ability to anticipate the 
needs and expectations of consumers, and to deliver to them a wide range of products 
of high quality and freshness at competitive prices.  
 
“…The freedom of retailers to provide their customers with the choice on what they want to buy, not the 
freedom to rip off or the freedom to poison, or the freedom to pull the wool over peoples eyes, what it is 
about is the freedom to provide the customer with the choices of the products they want to buy….” 
(Retailer Trade Association) 
 
The retailing industry continues its central position in the food system due to its 
capability to create and respond to the customers’ preferences. For example, when the 
distributors decide to label the products with GMO, or eliminate the ingredients of the ir 
own brands, this action has a cascading effect throughout the food industry, grain 
traders, and producers. 
 
As competing interests from consumer lobbies and regulatory bodies have grown, 
retailers have been skilful in accommodating a wider range of the overall political shifts 
into their approach to promote their wellbeing. Corporate retailers at the EU level now 
operate both independently and jointly through organisations like Euro Commerce 
(Flynn, et al. 2004). In the UK, retailers have to position themselves continuously and 
carefully as custodians of the consumer, distinguishing themselves from both the 
producer and food manufacturing interests. As the increasingly integrated European 
food market continues to show major food safety problems, the retailers have taken the 
opportunity to further embed retailer-led supply chain management.  
 
7.0 The evolving food regime IV: the Food Standards Agency in the context of 
the private interest model 
Despite the rising dominance and legitimacy of private interest groups the Food 
Standards Agency was established in the UK (in April 2000) to promote food safety 
and food standards as a non-ministerial department, focussing on the protection of 
consumers and their interests. Food quality and safety, it learned, were back in the 
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public (non-competitive) domain. The main aim of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
as set out in the enabling legislation in 1999 was:  
“to protect public health from risks which may arise in connection with the consumption of food 
(including risk s caused by way in which it is produced or supplied) and otherwise protect the interests of 
consumers in relation to food” (FSA, 2001).  
Unlike its predecessor unit in MAFF, the FSA could claim to be free from direct 
sponsorship of any food industry sector and is answerable to the minister for public 
health.  
The evolution of food regulation in the UK is driven primarily by the way food safety 
issues are perceived by large food retailers; leaving the state to act mainly as auditors 
rather than standard-setters and enforcers of the mainstream process. A hierarchical, 
private-public food regulatory regime in the UK predating the Food Standards Agency 
of April 2000 is schematically represented in Figure 1. 
 
It is important, therefore, to evaluate the formal role played by the FSA in creating a 
difference to food governance in the UK given the continued development of private 
interest regulation. The private interest, consumer and social interest, and regulatory 
interest groups were asked about their views on the FSA’s move towards a more 
transparent and inclusive process of governance, that contrasts sharply with the 
seemingly closed style of governance by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF). The views expressed by the three major interest groups interviewed in the 
research are summarised here. 
 
7.1 Private interest groups: not enough to name and shame! 
The FSA’s modus operandi in restoring consumer confidence by adopting the naming 
and shaming process was severely criticised by most of the priva te interest groups.  
“.. Does name and shame really restore in the consumer confidence in food? What it has done (the FSA) 
is that it has established the Food Standards Agency as an independent organisation that is willing to 
“blow the whistle” on big commerce, big commercial companies in the way that MAFF was perceived by 
consumer groups as not doing. It would be good if it (FSA) actually really took on its mantle of restoring 
confidence, restoring consumer confidence, if it actually adopted a policy of name and praise.” 
(Retailer) 
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One of the guiding principles of the FSA is to be open and accessible (to which it is 
being seen in Government circles as achieving). However, the private interest groups 
see it differently: 
 
“Transparency does not necessarily equate with effectiveness.  They’ve (FSA) not quite grasped that 
yet…” (Retailer) 
 
The FSA’s definition of ‘consumer interest’ was questioned by one of the private 
interest group, who stated: 
 
“we’re not sure what they (FSA) mean by consumer interests. Do they mean the interests of consumer 
organisations? If they’re talking about the interests of individual consumers, there are 59 million 
individual consumers in this country – each with a different set of priorities.” (Retailer) 
 
They further branded the functioning of the FSA to be politically motivated, by stating: 
 
“… the big problem is they (FSA) don’t have the evidence to determine why they’re seeking to change 
policy or to intervene in a particular area. And to that extent the FSA’s political. Now who the political 
drivers are within the FSA, on country of origin labelling or on assurance schemes or whatever – is in 
some areas difficult to say. But that is political. There is no doubt about it. Because they don’t have the 
evidence.” (Retailer) 
 
While there were criticisms on the way the Food Standards Agency functioned, some 
suppliers/manufacturers were of the view that the Agency has done a commendable 
job; and that it is now more willing to consult the industry. The transparent policy 
adopted by the Agency and the efforts made to dispel panic through its vast 
communication procedures among consumers were also appreciated. 
 
“…. things have changed now, for the better in the last few years, with the creation of the Food 
Standards Agency and DEFRA and they’re much more willing to consult with the industry.” (Food 
manufacturer) 
 
Views expressed by one of the private interest organisation reflect the fact that they 
appreciate the different mechanism of functioning of the FSA, as compared to the 
MAFF. 
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“The Food Standards Agency definitely thinks differently to what MAFF used to be, they are far more 
willing to discuss complicated issues in public and through that come to sensible certain decisions, 
where MAFF would have been absolutely petrified of having the discretion in the first place. So the FSA 
is dealing with is actually the most noticeable things, it’s done easy, its just that everything is open. We 
don’t have secrets and their view is very clear that their view is to protect  the customer.” (Retailer) 
7.2     Regulatory interest groups 
The regulatory interest groups exhibited a very cautious attitude regarding their views 
about the setting up and functioning of the FSA. 
“..If consumers are going to have confidence in food they need to have a champion out there who’s 
guided by sound science, guided by and not dictated by the politicians and that’s, that was the suggested 
place for the FSA.”  
Two of the local authorities interviewed, felt that the FSA had been helpful in their 
overall (local authority’s) functioning, as is evident from the following excerpts of the 
interviews with them. 
 
“….FSA was quite helpful and checking now and then we were happy with the way we were going.”  
 
“…since they were established. We have, a good relationship with them, and there’s a lot of mechanisms 
been put in place, and there is a good exchange of information between ourselves and the Agency.”  
 
7.3 Consumer & social interest groups 
The views gathered from the consumer and social interest group reflect criticisms on 
the lack of co-ordination between the FSA and the DEFRA; and unease in the way the 
FSA dealt with the GM issue. 
 “…..in terms of the objectives, in principle, clearly it’s positive we have an Agency now disconnected 
from other influences, supposedly and apparently. They’re purely and simply looking at what’s best from 
a food safety point of view, giving a view, whether that view is then accepted and put into 
implementation. So on the face of it that can be very positive. The negative side of that is from our 
experience, unless there’s an improvement in the co-operation between the FSA and for example 
DEFRA, there can be times when they will give a view in isolation and not really appreciate the 
implications of what they’re saying.”  
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On the issue over the GM free labelling, one of the consumer interest group had the 
following view about the manner in which the FSA acted: 
 
“….we couldn’t really understand why the FSA … this independent food watchdog was acting so 
outrageously… the FSA was an independent food watchdog, but everything they’ve ever done on GM and 
organics proves that they’re not… it just strikes me that they’re not being balanced and they’re not really 
being independent ….”  
 
However, some consumer organisations appreciated the role played by the FSA, and  
were impressed by the consumer focussed approach adopted by the FSA.  
 “Some things have changed since the formation of the FSA. There is a difference between transparency 
and openness which is difficult to measure and it is early days to know and there are also issues about 
whether always being transparent is beneficial.…”  
 
“We have been quite impressed with the consumer focussed approach that they’ve taken and that’s been 
helped by the way that the board meets in public and when we talk to individual board members they do 
feel personally responsible for the FSA and it fulfilling its role.”  
 
What is evident from these analyses is that, most consumer interest groups appreciate 
the new role played by the FSA, especially in putting consumers first and having 
consultations with many consumer groups. However, not many are in favour of the 
transparency approach adopted by the FSA, as they feel this approach may stifle new 
evidence. 
 
The scope of the FSA’s remit offers potential for joined-up policy thinking along the 
whole food chain, but it has been interpreted in fairly bounded terms. In practice, its 
rationale remains rooted in the dominant retailer- led paradigm. The Agency’s 
responsibility extends beyond food safety to include matters concerned with food 
quality,  consumer protection and choice; but, as demonstrated with it’s posturing with 
regard to GM and organics it steers clear of engaging in systemic discussions about 
supply chains, and how they might be redeveloped. Its effectiveness however, depends 
in part on the extent to which it is trusted by the public to provide reliable and impartial 
advice. Securing this trust largely depends on how the Agency identifies and takes 
appropriate action in response to risks to food safety and the public’s concerns; the 
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extent to which the public recognise the Agency as the authoritative source of advice 
and information on food standards; and how transparent the Agency is in its decision 
making and engages those who have an interest in food standards. 
 
8.0 Discussion & conclusions: the emerging hybrid model 
The paper has identified five significant recent developments in which the State, 
corporate and private interests, consumers and social interest groups build relationships 
in response to the need for accountability within the agri- food chain. This represents the 
development of a more complex public/private set of relationships- a third phase of 
regulation- which now embodies new public institutions (like the EFSA and the UK 
FSA) and a greater competitive ‘battle’ to win over the hearts and minds of consumers.  
The results of the research show first, that there is indeed a significant trend towards 
Europeanisation of food policy in the UK. Second, there is a growing 
institutionalisation of these policies, and the related empowerment of a different set of 
interest groups when specific issues e.g. GM- food, BSE and a multitude of other food 
safety issues are concerned. Third, private interest groups (particularly retailers) are 
increasingly playing a major role in (re)shaping the UK food policy.  
Nevertheless, there was consensus on issues of common interest, and there is a more 
flexible and participatory relationship between the private interest, policy and 
regulatory interest and consumer and social interest groups. The latter indicates that this 
is an amalgamation of a state-private sector model of food regulation; where there is a 
specific response from public and private sectors to the various pressures on food 
regulation (for example see Smith et al., 2004). It is worth noticing that this complex 
model is emerging as a response to the (post BSE) food regulation pressures in ways 
which safeguard the broader macro-economic and political concepts of the European 
Internal Market (EIM) and increasingly integrated exchange of food goods within and 
beyond Europe, while also simultaneously enunciating new standardised and ‘non-
competitive’ controls in the name of the European consumer and public interest.  
 
The emerging model of food regulation may have begun to lay a foundation for a more, 
all- inclusive and business- led regulatory system based on appeasing consumer and 
private sector apprehensions. The new and distinctive stimuli for this have arisen partly 
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due to the more exigent and intricate food risk environment And it appears (in the 
context of the UK at least) as though this trend will be maintained by, the interaction of 
a larger number of actors and policy networks (Fig 3), which, in turn, makes the 
evolution process more complex and potentially contingent. 
 
 This does not diminish the role of retailer-led private regulation as suggested in the 
earlier second phase of food regulation. It came out very strongly in the research that 
retailers, in the name of the consumer and public interest, are more influential, in food 
policy-making in the UK, partly as a result of their knowledge of and authority over the 
constructions of the consumer interest.  As one consumer interest organisation stated:  
 
“both legislators and consumers, are pushing (policy making), certainly from the consumer point of 
view.”  
 
“The consolidation and internationalisation of the food retail and manufacturing industry can be 
expected to continue”,  
 
according to the conclusions of an influential report2. One question therefore is: what 
does this mean for consumers? Despite the increasing power of both manufacturers and 
retailers, it suggests that it be consumers and those bodies most closely allied to them 
who drive the food supply chain in future.  
 
The new consumer is increasingly influencing the food system by selection or rejection 
of food considered healthy or hazardous; and large scale retailer’s organisations acting 
as intermediaries between the production and consumption are very sensitive to 
consumers’ preferences. 
 
 The importance of some key consumer trends (e.g. comfort, health, variety, 
individuality, enjoyment & security) can be evidenced in several important 
developments. First, the different links in the supply chain are increasingly attempting 
to communicate more directly with the end customer as they vie for that consumer’s 
business. Second, all the players want to have a greater impact on the shopper’s buying 
behaviour. Retailers are trying to influence the consumer mindset by presenting  
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Fig.3: The emerging food policy formation network in the UK 
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NCF - National Consumers’ Forum 
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RSPCA - Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals  
 
                                                                                                                                              
2 Report based on surveys with senior food executives and policy makers in 19 countries, along with extensive market analysis 
from consultants Cap Gemini Ernst and Young, 2003. 
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themselves as a brand. Indeed, brand competition is a key battleground between 
retailers themselves, and between them and the large food manufacturers. 
 
Marsden et al (2000) noticed a pendulum movement during the 1990s in which the 
deregulation in food markets and the disappearance of representative (production-
based) corporate organisations were gradually occupied by large-scale retailer’s 
organisations. According to the authors,  
 
“retailers, given their pivotal position in supplying choices and enhanced degrees of freedom conferred 
on them by government, become acutely important for the legitimisation of the state and more 
specifically for the management of the food system on behalf of the state and the consumer interest”. 
(p.193).  
 
While this power has been maintained and developed as they have sustained their 
market and regulatory power, the governance of food has now also, again become a 
territory for new state and consumer bodies. 
 
The overall tendency of food regulation, in this emerging and flexible framework 
therefore, appears, to generate more complexity due to uncertainty and risk related 
to food safety, as well as to reshuffle the power relations between different food 
supply chain players. In an effort to minimise food risks for consumers without 
creating impediments to the interna l markets, these new relationships between the 
state, corporate and non-corporate private and public interests has begun to offer a 
more practical and accountable food system. However, these new relationships 
could usher in other costs, such as a loss of local and regional diversity in food 
production and preparation (Smith et al., 2004).  
 
Thus, the new emerging third phase model of food regulation outlined in this paper; 
developing through the five dimensions analysed, suggests that retailers are now much 
more influential in controlling the quality and ‘value pathways’ of foods from ‘farm to 
fork’. However, the emergence of private- interest regulation does not steer clear of the 
need for the State to protect the consumer interest as it once might have done  (as in the 
second phase of food regulation outlined above). Now, private interest regulation needs 
a consultative and ‘stake-holder’ State such that it can appease growing consumer 
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concerns about the conventional food supply system. However, it does shape the ability 
of the State to act in the interest of the consumer. The need therefore is to map out its 
effects and impacts, and to measure how this model continually metamorphoses to the 
constantly emerging pressures of the ‘risk society’. The re-organisation of public food 
regulation through the setting up of the Food Standards Agency has been a significant  
introductory step in this regard. In this research we also set out to seek the formal role 
played by the FSA in creating a difference to food governance in the UK. The views 
held by the regulatory, private and consumer interest groups on FSA’s moves towards a 
more transparent and inclusive process of governance, positions the FSA as still in its 
infancy. And its effective functioning and acceptance as one of the UK’s reliable source 
of advice and information on food needs to be seen in its broader complex, 
public/private regulatory context which has begun to be outlined here.  
 38 
 
  
References 
 
 
Beckwith, J.A., Colgan, P.A. and Syme, G.J. (1999). Seeing risk through other eyes. In: 
C.D. Johnston (Ed), Contaminated site remediation: challenges posed by urban 
and industrial contaminants, proceedings of the 1999 contaminated site 
remediation conference, Centre for Groundwater Studies, CSIRO Land and 
Water, Western Australia. 
Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000). The Europeanisation of British central government, 
In: R.A.W. Rhodes (ed) Transforming British government, London: McMillan. 
Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000).The Europeanisation of British Central Government. 
In R. Rhodes (ed) Transforming British Government Vol.1-Changing Institutions. 
Macmillan: London. 
Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2001).The Europeanisation of Central Government: the UK 
and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective. In: M. Aspinwall and G. 
Schneider, G. (eds), The Rules of Integration. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
Bulmer, S. and Radaelli, C. (2004). The Europeanisation of National policy? 
Europeanisation Online papers, Queen’s University Belfast, No. 1/2004. 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schoolofPolicticsInternationalStudies/Research/PaperSeries
/EuropeanisationPapers/PublishedPapers/ 
Dobson, P.W. and Waterson, M. (1997). Countervailing power and consumer prices, 
Economic Journal 107, pp. 418-430. 
Ellahi, B. (1996). Genetic modification for the production of food: the food industry's 
response. British Food Journal, 98, 53-72. 
Euro monitor (2003) Grocery Stores/Food Retailers/Supermarkets in the UK 
http://www.marketresearch.com/product/display.asp 
European Commission, White paper on Food Safety, Brussels, 12 January 2000, COM 
(1999) 719 final, 61p. 
Fiddis, C. (1997). Manufacturers-retailers relationships in the Food and drinks Industry:  
Strategies and tactics in the battle for power. Financial Times Retail & Consumer 
Publications. 
 39 
Finucane, M. (2000). Improving quarantine risk communication: Understanding public 
risk perceptions. Report no. 7, Decision Research: Eugene, Oregon. 
Flynn, A., Marsden, T., Carson, L., Lee, R., Smith, E., Thankappan, S. and Yakovleva, 
N. (2004). The Food Standards Agency: making a difference? Communicated to 
the Journal of Public Administration. 
Frewer, L. J. (1999). Public Risk Perceptions and Risk Communication. In: Risk 
Communication and Public Health. P. Bennett and K. Calman, (eds), New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 20-32. 
FSA (2001). Putting consumers first, Strategic Plan (2001-2006). 
http://www.foodstandards.gov.uk 
Gutteling, J.M. and Kuttschreuter, M. (2002). The role of expertise in risk 
communication: Laypeople’s and expert’s perception of millennium bug risk in 
the Netherlands. Journal of Risk Research 5 (1): 35-47. 
Hall, P. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning and the state, Comparative Politics 
25 (3), 275-96. 
Hill, J.R. & Merton, I. (1995). Consumer expectations as perceived by retailers. 
Outlook on Agriculture, 24, 7-10. 
Howell, K.E. (2004). Developing conceptualisations of Europeanisation: A study of 
financial services. Politics 24 (1), 20-25. 
Langford, I.H. (2002). An existential approach to risk perception. Risk Analysis 22 (1): 
101-120. 
Margolis, H. (1996). Dealing with Risk: Why the public and experts disagree on 
environmental issues, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Marsden, T., Flynn, A., Harrison, M. (2000). Consuming Interests: The Social 
Provision of Foods. P. 220. London: UCL Press. 
Marsh, G. (2001). Community: The concept of the community in the risk and 
emergency context. Australian Journal of Emergency Management. Autumn. 
Mazey, S. and Richardson, J. (2001). Interests groups and EU policy making: 
Organisational logic and venue shopping, In: J. Richardson (ed) European Union: 
Power and policy making, London: Routledge. 
 40 
NRLO (1998) Market strategies and consumer behaviour Future initiatives for 
knowledge and innovation National Council for Agricultural Research NRLO 
Report no. 98/3E, The Hague, 1998,  http://www.agro.nl/nrlo 
Parliamentary Office of Technology (2001). Open channels: public dialogue in science 
and technology. Report No. 153, House of Commons, London. 
Peters, B.G. (1999). Institutional theory in political science, London: Continuum. 
Petts, J. and Leach, B. (2000). Evaluating methods for public participation. R&D 
Technical Report E135. Environmental agency, Bristol. 
Randall, E. (2002).Changing perceptions of risk in the European Union. In: The plan 
for a European Food Authority and the politics of risk in the European Union.  
http://www.policylibrary.com/essays/RandallEFARisk1.htm  accessed 12/3/2003. 
Richardson, K. (2000). Big business and the European Agenda. Working Papers in 
contemporary European Studies. University of Sussex. Sussex European Institute. 
Risse, T., Cowles, M. and Caporasso, J. (2001). Europeanisation and domestic change: 
Introduction, In: M. Cowles (ed) Transforming Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Siegrist, M. and Cvetovich, G. (2000). Perception of hazards: the role of social trust. 
Risk Analysis 20 (5): 713-719. 
Slovic, P. (1999). Trust, emotion, sex, politics and science: Surveying the risk 
assessment battlefield. Risk Analysis 19 (4): 689-701. 
Smith, E., Marsden, T., Flynn, A., and Percival, A. (2004). Regulating food risks: 
rebuilding confidence in Europe’s food? Environment and Planning C (in press). 
Star, C. (1984). Risk management, assessment and acceptability. In: V.T. Covello, L.B. 
Lave, A. Moghissi and V.R.R. Uppuluri (Eds.), Uncertainty in Risk assessment, 
Risk management and Decision making, New York: Plenum Press. 
Supermarkets (2000), A report on the supply of groceries from multiple stores in the 
UK. www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2000/446super.htm 
Trettin, L. and Musham, C. (2000). Is trust a realistic goal of environmental risk 
communication. Environment and behaviour 32 (3): 410-427. 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
Annex 
 
 
Private interest organisations 
  
· British Retail Consortium  
· Unilever   
· National Farmers' Union   
· Somerfield    
· Sainsbury’s   
· Northern Foods   
· Heinz UK   
· ASDA   
 
 
Regulatory interest organisations 
  
· Gloucester City Council   
· LACOTS   
· DEFRA   
 
 
Consumer & social interest organisations 
  
· UK FSA   
· RSPCA   
· Sustain   
· The Soil Association   
· Compassion in World Farming Trust  
· Consumers' Association   
· Friends of the Earth UK   
· Greenpeace UK   
· National Consumer Federation  
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